Read the other installments in this “Fundamentals” series here.
Having clarified Rambam’s position on the subject, we now turn our attention to Ramban, the other major source on the topic of ta’amei ha’mitzvos. We began this series with a discussion of shiluach ha’kein, and Ramban elaborates on his approach to ta’amei ha’mitzvos in his discussion of this topic. We start with his explanation of the commandment…
כי יקרא קן צפור לפניך גם זו מצוה מבוארת מן אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד (ויקרא כב כח) כי הטעם בשניהם לבלתי היות לנו לב אכזרי ולא נרחם או שלא יתיר הכתוב לעשות השחתה לעקור המין אע"פ שהתיר השחיטה במין ההוא…
If the nest of a bird chances to be in front of you: Also this commandment is explained by "it and its son do not slaughter on one day" (Leviticus 22:28); since the reason in both of them is that we should not have a cruel heart and [then] not have mercy, or that the verse should not permit us to be destructive to destroy the species, even though it allowed slaughter within that species…
Just like Rambam, Ramban is absolutely fine with positing reasons behind the commandments. That being said, his reason in this particular case of shiluach ha’kein is actually slightly different than Rambam’s. Specifically, Ramban is more focused and concerned with the effect that the mitzvah has on humans than he is with the effect that it will have on the animals. Ramban continues…
And the teacher (Rambam) in the Guide for the Perplexed 3:48 wrote that the reason of sending [the mother away from] the nest and the reason of "it and its son do not slaughter on one day" is to prohibit killing the child in the eyes of the mother, as animals have great concern about this. And there is no difference between the concern of a person and the concern of animals for their children, since the love of a mother and 'the appeal of the children of its belly' does not stem from the intellect and the [faculty of] speech, but rather it is from the effects of the faculty of thought that is found in animals just as it is found in man. And if [it is as Rambam claims], the main prohibition of 'it and its son' is only [in the sequence] of its son and it, but [in other circumstances] it is all a distancing [from that main prohibition]. And more correct is [that the reason for the commandment is] so that we will not become cruel.
Ramban does not disagree with Rambam in methodology. Both are in fundamental agreement that one can and should attempt to seek reasons behind the commandments. Ramban simply takes issue with the specific reason Rambam gives for the mitzvah of shiluach ha’kein, instead suggesting a reason he thinks is more logical.
And the teacher said: And don't answer me from the statement of the sages [that comes to explain] (Berakhot 33b), "We silence the one who says, 'Your mercy reaches the nest of the bird.' [is because this commandment is a decree that has nothing to do with mercy]," as this is one of two explanations - the explanation of the one to whom it appears that there is no reason for the commandments except for the will of the Creator - but we hold of the second explanation, [according to which] there should be an explanation for all of the commandments… And this matter that the teacher asserted is very lucid regarding commandments that have a reason, as there is in each one a reason and a purpose and a refinement for the person, besides their reward from their Commander, may He be blessed.
Returning once more to the Gemara with which we began this entire discussion of ta’amei ha’mitzvos, Ramban agrees with Rambam that we should not be troubled by the opinion found in the Gemara that mitzvos have no discernible reasons are are simply Divine decrees. Rather, all mitzvos absolutely do have very important reasons. Indeed, Ramban continues…
Behold, they elucidated that the impediment to the reasons for the commandments is not from Him abut rather [from] the blindness of our intellects and that the reason of the most difficult one was already reveled to the sages of Israel. And there are many [statements] like this and many things in Torah and Scripture that indicate [it]. [And] those homiletical statements that were challenging to [Rambam], are about a different matter, according to my opinion. As they wanted to say that there is no gain in the commandment for the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself, may He be elevated; but [rather] the gain is for man himself - to prevent him from damage or a bad belief or a disgusting character trait, or to remember the miracles and wonders of the Creator, may He be blessed, and to know God. And this is [the meaning of] "to purify them" - that they should be like purified silver; as the action of a smelter is not without a reason, but [rather] to extract all the dross from it.
Ramban actually sees the statement in the Gemara that mitzvos are only decrees — and other similar statements throughout Chazal — as being even less problematic than we originally thought. According to Ramban, statements in Chazal to the effect that mitzvos have no reasons mean only that they have no benefit to God, but rather are only for the benefit of mankind. After citing a number of proofs and examples of this — and explaining the reasons for various other mitzvos; how they benefit mankind but do not ultimately improve God in any way — Ramban returns to his discussion of the mitzvah of shiluach ha’kein specifically and concludes as follows…
And behold, these commandments with animals and birds are not mercy upon them, but [rather] decrees upon us, to guide us and to teach us the good character traits. And so [too] all of the commandments - positive and negative - are called decrees; as they said (Mekhilta, Bechodesh 6) about a parable of a king that entered into a country: "His servants said to him, 'Make decrees upon them.' He said [back] to them, 'When they accept My kingship, I will make decrees upon them.' So did the Holy One, blessed be He, say; 'You accepted My Kingship - "I am the Lord, your God" (Exodus 20:2) - [now,] accept My decrees - "there shall be for you no, etc."' (Exodus 20:3)." But in the Midrash of Rabbi Nechunia ben HaKaneh, there is a midrash [that explains] that there is a secret in the commandment: "Rabbi Rechumai said, 'Why is it written, "Surely send away the mother" and it did not say, "the father?" But rather, "Surely send the mother" is in honor of that Discernment (Binah), the Mother of the world, as it is written (Proverbs 2:3), "But you will call discernment, Mother."' What is 'and the children take for yourself?' Rabbi Rechumai said, 'Those children that she grew.' And what are they? The seven days of the sukkah and the laws of the seven days of the week, etc." And behold, this commandment hints to a great matter, and therefore its reward is very large - "so that it will be good for you and you will lengthen your days."
Ramban highlights his point that the mitzvah is more for the benefit of mankind than it is for the benefit of the animals.
Ramban then addresses the fact that all mitzvos are referred to as “decrees” explaining that there are two reasons for this: One, all mitzvos are all ultimately commanded by the King, and, all else aside, are thus to be followed simply by dint of God’s authority. Two, that in addition to the reasons man can suggest, mitzvos like shiluach ha’kein also have hidden, secret reasons that are beyond complete human comprehension.
In conclusion, then, Ramban and Rambam — the two great medieval titans of Jewish philosophy — are in fundamental agreement as to the topic of ta’amei ha’mitzvos: All mitzvos indeed have humanly discernible reasons that there is great benefit in positing, learning, and understanding; we need not be concerned with various statements in Chazal that seems to disagree with this premise; there are deeper, perhaps even supernatural, reasons, benefits, and effects that mitzvos have that remain hidden to mankind, and thus any suggested reason for a mitzvah is only a possible reason, not the reason for the commandment.
In the next installment we shall turn our attention to various other perspectives on the topic of ta’amei ha’mitzvos.